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Abstract  
We introduce a new “different lives” survey format, which asks respondents to rank 
hypothetical lives described in terms of longevity, health, happiness, income, and other 
elements of the quality of life. In this short paper, we show that the format is of policy 
relevance whether a mental state, preference satisfaction or extra-welfarist account of 
well-being is adopted and discuss some of the advantages the format has over standard 
formats, such as contingent valuation surveys and QALY-type methods. An exploratory 
survey indicates that the format is feasible and that health and happiness might be more 
important than income and life expectancy. (100 words) 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Scholars have developed various ways to value the health and well-being consequences 
of public policies and interventions. Two prominent approaches are “compensating 
variations” that measure how much individuals are willing to pay or accept in exchange 
for a policy (Just et al., 2004, pp. 123-82) and a focus on health using quality-adjusted 
life years (QALYs) (Dolan, 2000). We propose a new approach in which respondents are 
asked to rank or rate “different lives”, characterised in terms of different dimensions of 
overall quality of life, such as longevity, health, happiness, and income. Basically, 
respondents are asked to decide which combination of levels of the dimensions they 
would prefer, e.g. a longer life in poorer health with higher happiness and lower income 
as compared to a shorter life in better health with lower happiness and higher income. 
From responses to these questions, it is possible to determine the relative weights 
attached to dimensions that make up our lives. In one sense, this approach can be seen as 
an extension of the QALY approach by incorporating dimensions of value beyond health.  
 
In the next section of this short paper, we set out the intellectual backdrop for this new 
“different lives” survey format and show how it is relevant whatever account of well-
being or quality of life is adopted (including extra-welfarism which has attracted attention 
in health economics). In section three, we show the format can be used in a number of 
applications, including economic evaluation and in generating a social welfare function, 
and we show how it compares to other more widely used survey formats in these 
contexts. In section four, we report on the results of a pilot study of students in the US 
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and UK to test the feasibility of the approach. The results are only indicative but suggest 
that health and happiness are more important than longevity and income, especially in the 
UK. In the concluding section, we suggest that the different lives survey format has the 
potential to inform policy decisions in health and elsewhere and we recommend future 
studies to generate results from more representative samples using different levels and 
definitions of the dimensions. 
 
2. DIFFERENT LIVES SURVEYS AND ACCOUNTS OF WELL-BEING 
 
Health economists have debated whether “welfarist” or “extra-welfarist” approaches to 
health policy are appropriate (Culyer, 1990; Brouwer and Koopmanschap, 2000; Birch 
and Donaldson, 2003; Brouwer et al., 2007). In general terms, welfarism is seen to focus 
on well-being, understood in terms of preference-satisfaction or happiness, while extra-
welfarism is seen to adopt a broader conception of the quality of life that may include 
elements such as health, social relations, and the realisation of other “capabilities.” A 
debate is also taking place between preference-based approaches to policy and 
“happiness-based” approaches (Kelman, 2005; Adler and Posner, 2007; Dolan and 
Kahneman, 2008). A preference-based approach allows an individual’s utility function to 
contain mental states and also arguments that may be distinct from mental states, such as 
health and income. Some happiness-based approaches limit the arguments in the utility 
function to the mental states associated with different kinds of affect (pleasure, pain and 
the like) whilst others allow for more evaluative judgements of overall happiness, which 
may include cognitive assessments of how well life is going generally. 
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So, whilst virtually everyone accepts that improving the quality of individual lives should 
be the goal of policy, there are different conceptions of the quality of an individual life. 
Whilst there are no right or consensus definitions of terms like “extra-welfarism,” 
“welfarism” and “happiness”, we suggest that the following definitions help to clarify the 
debate: extra-welfarism allows the quality of an individual life to be something more than 
the satisfaction of preferences and more than a matter of mental states, preference-based 
welfarism says that the quality of an individual life is a matter of preference-satisfaction 
and mental-state welfarism says that the quality of an individual life is a matter of the 
quality of the individual’s mental states.    
 
What, then, is the relevance of different lives surveys to extra-welfarism? These surveys 
provide information about preferences and might therefore appear to be of little relevance 
to extra-welfarists. However, an important question for extra-welfarists concerns the 
source of value judgments about the quality of life. Extra-welfarists often suggest that a 
deliberative process, involving policy-makers and citizens, is the appropriate body for 
judging the quality of outcomes and individuals’ lives. (Brouwer et al 2007). 
Whatever the precise mechanisms, it would be rather odd to suggest that those engaged in 
this valuation process should wholly ignore utility information. Therefore, "different 
lives” surveys can serve as one input into the valuation process. 
 
Such surveys can also illustrate the extent of the divergence between preference 
welfarism and extra-welfarism. The good of health illustrates this point. Many extra-
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welfarists emphasize the importance of health to the quality of individual lives, 
independent of individual utility. Now, it is an empirical question whether health has a 
large or small role in the utility function. If it has a larger role, preference welfarism and 
health-based extra-welfarism will have more closely convergent recommendations for 
health policy. If it has a smaller role, preference-welfarism and an extra-welfarist 
approach that places a large weight on health will end up with more divergent 
recommendations for health policy.  
 
The role of different lives surveys to a preference-based welfarist approach is more 
substantial. Whilst much of the economics literature focuses on income as the main (and 
sometimes only) arguments in the utility function, any argument, including mental states 
and health, is relevant provided individuals have a preference or desire towards it (Adler 
and Posner, 2007). The problem then becomes determining the relative weights attached 
to those arguments. A different lives survey, asking each respondent to rank the different 
possible lives she might lead, should be an appealing survey format to determine the 
weights attached to different arguments in the utility function. 
 
Different lives surveys may appear to be less relevant to mental state welfarists since they 
have already decided that it is only mental states that are important for well-being. 
However, a survey asking for trade-offs between happiness and non-mental state 
dimensions can illustrate the extent of the divergence between preference welfarism and 
mental-state welfarism. If happiness is the most significant argument in the utility 
function, then preference welfarism and mental state welfarism will tend to converge in 
 6
their policy recommendations. If individuals have strong preferences for dimensions 
other than mental states, then preference welfarism and mental state welfarism will tend 
to diverge in their recommendations. 
 
Moreover, different lives surveys asking for trade-offs between happiness and non-
mental state dimensions can help answer an important question about individual behavior 
which is much discussed in the happiness literature. There is evidence that individuals 
often fail, in practice, to maximise their own happiness (see Layard, 2005, for an 
extended argument that individuals could be much happier). One hypothesis to explain 
this behavior is that individuals ultimately care mainly about happiness but are vulnerable 
to “affective forecasting” errors and other biases that prevent them from successfully 
maximising happiness (Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). A competing hypothesis is that 
individuals ultimately care about a variety of non-mental state dimensions, such as health 
or income, in addition to happiness. Different lives surveys can help answer the question 
about the relative merits of these competing reasons for why individuals fail to maximise 
their own happiness. Indeed, the survey format was developed partly out of on-going 
discussion between the two authors about the relative merits of these two possibilities. 
 
In sum, a different lives survey format should be relevant whichever account of well-
being or quality of life is adopted: extra welfarism, preference welfarism, or mental-state 
welfarism. How the format compares to existing survey instruments designed to value 
health and well-being, and how it might be used in shaping policy choice, are questions 
to which we now turn. 
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3. DIFFERENT LIVES SURVEYS AND ENHANCING POLICY MEASURES 
 
One policy-analysis tool, traditionally favoured by preference welfarists, is cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) (Just et al., 2004; Adler and Posner 2006). CBA evaluates policies by 
summing “compensating variations” (CVs) which reflect the amount of money necessary 
to hold utility constant given a change in some non-income dimension. CVs for market 
goods are typically estimated through “revealed preference” methodologies, but it is often 
difficult to use revealed preference methodologies to estimate CVs for non-market goods. 
As a result, “contingent valuation” surveys are often used to estimate CVs (Bateman et 
al., 2002). If individuals answer such questions by expressing their preferences, then – in 
principle – the answers can be used to estimate utility as a function both of income and of 
other attributes.  
 
However, there are various difficulties in using contingent valuation questions to estimate 
a utility function, such as insensitivity to the size of the good being valued (scope effects) 
(Venkatchalam 2004), and the propensity of respondents to answer by expressing 
attitudes rather than preferences (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005). In addition, some 
preference-relevant attributes of possible lives are not directly impacted by government 
e.g. policies may change income (by levying taxes) fairly directly but will have a less 
direct effect on happiness. Using contingent valuation studies to estimate the relative 
contribution of happiness and income to individual utility is therefore difficult. Against 
this background, different lives surveys can usefully supplement revealed and stated 
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preference evidence by calibrating a utility function which can be used to calculate CVs 
in much the same way as happiness data are now being used to calculate income 
compensations (van Praag and Baarsma, 2005; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008). 
 
In health care, of course, cost-utility analysis (CUA) using QALYs is now commonplace 
and owes much to an extra-welfarist perspective. An important issue in CUA is where to 
set the cost-per-QALY cutoff ratio. Extra-welfarists should, presumably, set that ratio 
with an eye to the relative importance of health and non-health characteristics to quality 
of life, and different lives surveys can help inform that judgment of relative importance. 
One standard format in the calculation of QALYs assigns values to health states through 
a time trade-off (TTO) or standard gamble (SG) question. The TTO and SG questions 
elicit respondents’ preferences over health and longevity but do not elicit preferences 
over other characteristics that individuals or policy-makers may care about, such as 
happiness.  
 
Another standard survey format is happiness or life-satisfaction questions. The main 
problem with these measures is that they do not adopt a lifetime perspective (Williams, 
1997). Many existing measures of health and well-being adopt a time-slice or, at best, a 
prospective assessment of the quality of life when arguably a lifetime perspective is the 
most appropriate for policy purposes. By asking respondents to consider their lifetime 
prospects across a range of dimensions, a more complete picture of the quality of life is 
developed. 
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Some preference welfarists believe that a social welfare function (SWF) rather than CBA 
should be employed to evaluate policies. (Blackorby et al, 2005; Adler and Sanchirico, 
2006)  The rationale is that a SWF can correct for diminishing marginal utility of income 
and can also reflect a concern for equalising well-being itself. A utility function u is used 
to transform each outcome into a vector of utilities, one for each individual in the 
population; a SWF w then maps that vector onto a scalar, representing how good the 
outcome is as compared to others. In other words, u(o) = (u1 …uI), where ui is the utility 
of individual i in outcome o, there are I individuals in the population, and w(u(o)) > 
w(u(o*)) means that o is a better outcome than o*.   Different lives surveys can be 
employed to calibrate u. 
 
Although the origins of the SWF approach lies in preference welfarism, the approach 
could also be employed within extra-welfarism with health, rather than utility, as inputs 
(Wagstaff, 1991; Dolan, 1998). Presumably this approach is too narrow, because even 
extra-welfarists should acknowledge that the quality of individual life depends on more 
than health. A better approach, conceptually, is to use a value function v(.) that assigns a 
number to each life as a function of both health and non-health characteristics, and then 
to apply the social welfare function w to the vector (v1 …vI) (See List, 2004, discussing 
SWFs defined on multiple dimensions of individual well-being). Different lives surveys 
asking for tradeoffs between health and other characteristics could be one useful source 
of information in constructing the value function v. 
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Both preference welfarists and extra-welfarists could endorse the use of different lives 
surveys to help refine multi-dimensional quality-of-life metrics. The World Health 
Organization Quality of Life Instrument (“WHOQOL”), for example, consists of 6 
overall domains, divided into 24 dimensions such as pain and discomfort, positive 
feelings, mobility, personal relationships, physical security and safety, financial 
resources, and physical environment (The WHOQOL Group 1998; Bonomi et al., 2000). 
Typically, these quality-of-life scales have been based in scholarly discussion rather than 
survey research and so different lives surveys can help determine what the different 
dimensions of a quality-of-life metric should be.  
 
4. SURVEY 
 
To test the feasibility of the different lives format, we conducted a study of 40 students in 
a university in London and 32 students in a university in Philadelphia. In some ways, the 
basic structure of the questionnaire is similar to that developed by Holmes (1997), in 
which she asked respondents to rank person-types, characterized in terms of occupation, 
gender, family status, and health state, and then to perform a TTO task across types. 
However, the person-types were not described as having different income or happiness 
levels, and the design was focused on estimating health state values rather than 
comparing different lives in the more general sense used here. 
 
There were two levels of each of the four dimensions of well-being. Life expectancy was 
65 or 75; health was specified as being ‘able to move around freely’ or ‘hard to move 
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around without assistance’; and happiness was expressed 95% or 80% of the time in a 
good mood. Income in the UK was £45,000 or £30,000, whilst in the US it was $300,000 
or $100,000. The numbers were different because of different expected earnings of the 
students and the relativities were different to test whether the results were sensitive to 
this. This generates 16 different lives. The study design asked individuals to rank two 
pages of eight scenarios. We excluded the logically best and worst scenarios so that two 
scenarios could be placed on both pages. This enabled us to infer a ranking for all 
possible lives.  
 
From these data, we run a rank-ordered logistic regression model, where an individual’s 
utility function is given by: 
1 2 3 4(.) ( , , , )U V Y H HS LE Y H HS LEε β β β β ε= + = + + + +  
Assuming that each individual knows their own preferences, the random part, ε, accounts 
for the fact that we cannot observe the individual’s true utility function. The table below 
summarises the results.  
 
 UK (n=40) US (n=32) UK and US 
Income 0.566 1.095 0.777 
Health 2.758 3.726 3.109 
Happiness 1.633 1.816 1.672 
Life Exp 0.334 1.202 0.684 
Log likelihood -651.4387 -478.1733 -1145.141 
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It is worth noting that all the coefficients are significant at the 1% level, which means that 
the differences in the levels of these dimensions were all seen as being important to 
respondents. In both the UK and US samples, the coefficient on health was largest, 
followed by the coefficient on happiness. Income and life expectancy were less important 
in the UK sample than in the U.S. Of course, the size of the coefficients on the four 
dimensions is sensitive to the high-low endpoints for health, happiness, income, and life 
expectancy used to generate the 16 different lives. For example, if the two possible life 
expectancies had been 50 and 75 rather than 65 and 75, the coefficient on life expectancy 
would presumably have been larger in both samples. We must reiterate the exploratory 
nature of this study but it is encouraging that the number of responses where a logically 
worse state was preferred to a logically better state was less than 10% in the UK and less 
than 5% in the US. We would not wish to draw any real conclusions from these data 
beyond their general face validity. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
We suggest that the different lives survey format has the potential to inform policy 
decisions regardless of whether the underlying normative framework is extra-welfarism, 
preference-welfarism, or mental-state welfarism. The survey format also has some 
advantages over existing ways of valuing health and well-being. A small study of 
students suggests that the method is a feasible one. Our preliminary results suggest that 
happiness is not the sole determinant of utility. Such a finding, if confirmed in subsequent 
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studies, would suggest that the debate between preference welfarists and mental-state 
welfarists has real significance for policy choice. It might also suggest that the failure of 
individuals to maximize their own happiness may be due, not merely to “affective 
forecasting” errors, but to a fundamental preference for items other than happiness, 
although it does still leave open the possibility that these items are seen to contribute to 
mental states of some kind or another. 
 
Also of interest is the fact that, in both samples, health was the most important 
dimension. If this is not merely an artifact of small samples or the definition of the 16 
different lives in our study, it suggests that extra-welfarist and preference welfarist 
approaches to policy making could be less divergent than the literature suggests. We now 
recommend additional studies to generate results from more representative samples using 
different levels and definitions of the dimensions.  
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